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21 Introduction
The last decade has witnessed a growing interest in the black-white wealth gap. His-
torically, income disparity between blacks and whites has narrowed down (Smith &
Welch 1989), nevertheless, wealth disparity remains large. While blacks earn be-
tween 50% and 64% of whites’ income, blacks’ wealth only represents between 12%
and 20% of whites’ wealth (Blau & Graham 1990, Wolff 1994, Menchik & Jianakoplos
1997, Oliver & Shapiro 1997). Recent studies on racial differences in wealth have at-
tempted to explain gaps in wealth levels and growth rates by differences in income,
education, and patterns of marriage and fertility (Gittleman & Wolff 2003, Altonji
& Doraszelski 2001). This paper’s concern is whether causality also works in the
opposite direction, that is, whether initial wealth disparity explains black-white dif-
ferences in employment rates and wages for High School graduates. I estimate a
dynamic model of wealth accumulation and job search and find that initial wealth
plays a modest role in explaining racial differences in early employment careers, al-
though initial wealth is an important determinant of the observed racial wealth gap.
With imperfect capital markets, wealth affects job search outcomes by allowing
wealthier agents to search longer and obtain higher wages. This effect is formalized
by a utility-maximizing job search model where agents’ reservation wages depend
positively on their wealth levels. Thus, wealth accumulation is part of an optimal
job search strategy in which unemployed agents run down their wealth to maintain
their consumption, and employed agents accumulate wealth to hedge against future
unemployment spells and to move to better paid jobs. It is clear that skill gaps can be
an important determinant of the black-white wage differences.(Neal & Johnson 1996).
Consequently, to abstract from the effect of wealth in employment outcomes through
schooling, I restrict the analysis to individuals of the same level of schooling.
The empirical strategy consists of recovering the behavioral parameters of the
model applying the method surveyed by Rust (1988) and Eckstein & Wolpin (1989).
I use the numerical solution to the joint job search and consumption problem to con-
3struct a likelihood function for the observed paths of wealth, wages and employment,
which is maximized over the behavioral parameters. Under this strategy, also used by
Wolpin (1992) to study black-white employment differences, one can perform regime
changes that take explicitly into account the often overlooked distinction between
permanent and transitory income fluctuations. I study the effects on wages of two
regime changes consisting in assigning blacks: (i) the initial wealth distribution of
whites, and (ii) the arrival rates and the wage offer distribution of whites. The first
regime change produces an important initial effect in blacks’ wages that disappears
very rapidly: at the 40th quarter after graduation, a benchmark for making the black-
white outcome comparison, the average wage of blacks stays unaffected at a 75% of
the average wage of whites. Nevertheless, because of this change, the wealth of blacks
increases from being 40% of the wealth of whites to being 52%. The second regime
change has a more substantial effect on wages: the average wage of blacks rises from
75% to 102% of the average wage of whites. In spite of this increase, the black-white
wealth gap does not disappear, although it narrows down: the wealth of blacks in the
40th quarter after graduation increases from 40% to 69% of the wealth of whites. La-
bor market variables such as wage offer distributions and arrival rates, and not initial
assets, are responsible for most of the observed differences in employment careers.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section explains the
data source, the National Longitudinal Survey of Labor Market Experience Youth
Cohort (NLSY), the selection of the sample and the descriptive statistics; Section 3
describes the model and discusses the maximum likelihood estimation procedure;
Section 4 presents the results of the estimation, and Section 5 presents regime changes
based on the estimated parameters of the model. The main conclusions of the paper
are summarized in Section 6
42 Data
2.1 Sample Selection
The National Longitudinal Survey of LaborMarket Experience Youth Cohort (NLSY)
contains data on household composition, military experience, school enrollment, and
a week by week accounting of employment status, hourly wages, hours worked, and
employers. An individual’s complete weekly work history can be constructed from
1978 until 1993. Respondents whose employment histories started before 1978, i.e.,
those born before 1961, are dropped from the sample, because it is impossible to
construct a complete employment history for them. The final sample consists of 212
white and 158 black high school male graduates born after December 31, 1960, who
never went to college nor had any type of military experience. White males were
taken from the core sample; black males were selected from the core and from the
supplemental sample. Wolpin (1992) and Rendon (2002) also used this selection,
aimed to include those individuals whose behavior is well described with a search-
theoretic framework without a decision to join the military.
To make the estimation tractable, I aggregate the data into quarters. Each in-
dividual’s reported last week of school enrollment is assigned to its corresponding
calendar quarter; employment history is defined to start in the quarter thereafter.
An individual is considered to be employed if he works 20 or more hours during the
first week of the quarter; any other job held during the quarter is ignored. Otherwise
he is reported as “unemployed” for that quarter. Reasons for leaving a given employer
are classed as layoffs or quits. Individuals returning to work for their old employers
are considered as having taken new jobs. The quarterly wage related to that job is
the wage of the first week of the quarter in 1985 dollars times 13. The Consumer
Price Index is used to deflate nominal values into real amounts.
Annual data on the market value of wealth are only available for years 1985 until
1993, with the exception of year 1991; this information is assigned to the calendar
5quarter in which the interview took place, leaving all other quarters blank. Wealth
consists of residential property, financial assets, business assets, vehicles and other
assets (like jewelry or furniture), each net of debts. All these components are com-
puted at their “market value”, defined by the NLSY as the amount the respondent
would reasonably expect someone else to pay if the particular asset were sold today
in its present condition. Any debt owed for any of these components is subtracted
from the total value of each component. Because wealth is thought of as a store of
value, these components are treated as being equally liquid, meaning that wealth is
defined as the sum of its different components. If the respondent does not report at
least one of them, the wealth variable is reported as not available.
2.2 Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 shows the evolution of employment rates and transitions, wealth and wages
for three years after High School graduation. From year 3 to year 9 after graduation,
the fraction of whites who are unemployed decreases from 18% to 9%, while the
corresponding percentage for blacks decreases from 34% to 20%. In the same period,
whites increase their wealth from $6,023 to $13,329, whereas blacks increase their
wealth from $1,226 to $5,223, that is, the black-white ratio of average wealth increases
from 20% to 39%. The percentage of people with more than $10,000 increases from
19% to 43% for whites, and from 1% to 15% for blacks. Average wages of whites
increase from $3,363 to $4,552; average wages of blacks increase from $3,104 to $3,739,
meaning that the black-white ratio of average wage decreases from 92% to 82%. It is
clear that wealth accumulation does accompany the increase in labor market activity
that occurs after these individuals graduate from High School and that a reduction
in the racial wealth gap is associated with a widening of the racial wage gap.
[Table 1 here]
6Table 2 shows the relationship between the level and the composition of wealth
by race group and years of working experience. These patterns in the composition
of wealth coincide with those shown in other studies (Jianakoplos, Menchik & Irvine
1989, Blau & Graham 1990, Smith 1995). Wealthier people in both groups tend to
have a higher proportion of their wealth in the form of residential property, business,
farms or other form of property. Among white individuals with no more than 6 years
of employment history, those with no more than $10,000 have only 7% of their wealth
in residential property. The corresponding percentage of blacks is substantially lower:
2%. The percentages for those with more than $30,000 are 23% for whites and 15% for
whites. This relationship between wealth and proportion of wealth held as residential
property is maintained 6 years after graduation. There is also a fairly clear positive
correlation between the percentage of business property and wealth. However, at the
same wealth level blacks systematically exhibit a lower percentage of their wealth in
business property than whites, denoting a relative absence of blacks’ owned businesses
(Fairlie 1999, Fairlie & Meyer 2000). The proportion of wealth in the form of vehicles
shows a very clear negative correlation with wealth. This trend is similar for both
race groups and does not seem to change significantly with the increase in the number
of years after graduation. Financial assets are the most liquid component of wealth,
but they show no clear link with the level of wealth.
[Table 2 here]
Table 3 shows the average wealth by wage levels, years after graduation and race
group. It shows that agents with higher wages tend to have a higher level of wealth.
No more than 6 years after graduation, whites with wages lower than $2,000 have
an average wealth of $1,368, whereas whites with wages over $6,000 have an average
wealth of $8,744. The corresponding amount of wealth of blacks for the same wage
brackets are, respectively, $730 and $6,115. These descriptive statistics show the exis-
tence of a link between labor market aspects and wealth accumulation. Differences in
7wages and in wealth between the two race groups are both noteworthy and persistent
over time.
[Table 3 here]
3 Model
In this section I describe a model of wealth accumulation and job search under bor-
rowing constraints. I use the solution to this model to construct a likelihood function
for the observed transitions of employment, wages and wealth, which I maximize
over the behavioral parameters of the theoretical model. The numerical solution of
the model and the computation of the likelihoof function are both based in Rendon
(2002).
3.1 Job Search and Consumption
An individual who maximizes his expected utility of consumption over T quarters
can be employed or unemployed. While unemployed he receives, with probability λ
e
,
one wage offer x drawn from the known wage offer distribution F (·), x ∈ (w,w), 0 <
w < w <∞. An unemployed individual becomes employed if he receives and accepts
a wage offer; otherwise he remains unemployed. Transitions from unemployment are
illustrated in the following scheme:
[Figure 1 here]
While employed, an individual can be laid off with probability θ and receive a new
wage offer with probability λ
e
, drawn from the same distribution F (·). If he is not
laid off and receives a job offer, he can accept it and switch to a new job, reject it and
stay in the current job, or reject it and quit to unemployment. If he is not laid off
8and does not receive a job offer, he has to decide between staying in his current job or
quitting to unemployment. If he is laid off, he can still receive a job offer; accepting it
means switching to a new job; rejecting it means becoming unemployed. If a person
is laid off and does not receive any offer, he does not have any other option than to
become unemployed. The possible transitions from being employed are shown below.
[Figure 2 here]
When unemployed the agent receives transfers b, which include non-labor income,
such as family transfers and unemployment compensation net of search costs. At
each period, given his employment state and his wealth A
t
, the agent determines his
consumption C
u
t
and C
e
t
, and thereby his wealth for the next period A
u
t+1
and A
e
t+1
.
Initial wealth is inherited and final wealth is zero. The rate of return is r and is
constant; the subjective discount factor is β ∈ (0, 1). Agents can save freely, but
borrowing is restricted so that current wealth cannot be lower than a time-dependent
level B
t
. In a free capital market people can borrow up to the level that they can
pay back with probability one, which is determined by the present discounted value
of the lowest possible income level b:
˜
B
t
= −
∑
T
s=t
b
1
(1+r)
T−s
.
With a utility function U (·) satisfying the Inada condition, lim
C→0
U
′
(C) = ∞
, any constraint B
t
<
˜
B
t
is redundant, so that potentially binding constraints are
B
t
>
˜
B
t
. Let s measure the tightness of the borrowing constraint as a fraction of
˜
B
t
,
then the lower bound on wealth is B
t
= s
˜
B
t
, s ∈ [0, 1].
When unemployed, expected lifetime utility at time t V
u
t
depends on wealth A
t
:
V
u
t
(A
t
) = max
A
u
t+1
≥B
t+1
{
U
(
A
t
+ b−
A
u
t+1
1 + r
)
+β
[
λ
u
∫
max
[
V
e
t+1
(A
u
t+1
, x), V
u
t+1
(A
u
t+1
)
]
dF (x) + (1 − λ
u
)V
u
t+1
(A
u
t+1
)
]}
.
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e
t
at time t depends on wealth A
t
and
wage w:
V
e
t
(A
t
, w) = max
A
e
t+1
≥B
t+1
{
U
(
A
t
+ w −
A
e
t+1
1 + r
)
+β
[
(1− θ)(λ
e
∫
max
[
V
e
t+1
(A
e
t+1
, x), V
e
t+1
(A
e
t+1
, w), V
u
t+1
(A
e
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)
]
dF (x)
+ (1 − λ
e
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[
V
e
t+1
(A
e
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, w), V
u
t+1
(A
e
t+1
)
])
+θ
(
λ
e
∫
max
[
V
e
t+1
(A
e
t+1
, x), V
u
t+1
(A
e
t+1
)
]
dF (x) + (1 − λ
e
)V
u
t+1
(A
e
t+1
)
)]}
.
The solution to these equations consists of two policy rules A
u
t+1
(A
t
) and A
e
t+1
(A
t
, w),
and of a reservation wage w
∗
t
(A
t
) = {w| V
u
t
(A
t
) = V
e
t
(A
t
, w)}. These solutions are
no analytical but numerical, that is, one needs to assume specific functional forms for
the utility and the wage offer distribution function: a constant relative risk aversion
(CRRA) utility function U(C) =
C
1−γ
−1
1−γ
, where γ is the coefficient of risk-aversion,
and a log-normal wage offer distribution lnx ∼ N (µ, σ
2
|w,w), 0 < w < w < ∞.
Then the model is solved recursively on a discretized state space. As done by Wolpin
(1992), the estimation is made tractable assuming that the individual solves the DP
problem using longer period lengths for the more distant future value functions.
3.2 Likelihood function
For each parameter set I compute the policy rules that solve the dynamic program-
ming problem, and use them to construct probability statements for each transition
in employment, wages, and wealth. The resulting function relates a parameter set to
a likelihood value. The estimation is thus a maximum likelihood procedure in which
the estimates are the behavioral parameters, the maximizers of this function.
The observed variables are Z
it
=
{
A
obs
it
, w
obs
it
, d
it
, l
it
}
, that is, wealth, wages, em-
ployment status, unemployed or employed: d = {u, e}, and layoffs, l = 0 (quit) or
l = 1 (layoff). Because the model does not predict a true initial level of wealth, the
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estimation starts at period t
0
, defined as the period when wealth is first observed.
This implies that data between 1978 and 1985 are not used in this estimation. The
log-likelihood function is the sum of the individuals’ log-likelihood, which is the den-
sity for observing a particular sequence of wealth, wages, and employment transitions,
conditional on the first observation and on the parameters Θ:
lnL(Θ) =
N
∑
i=1
lnL
i
({Z
it
}
T
i
t=t
0
+1
| Z
it
0
Θ).
The individuals’ likelihood contribution can be computed as the product of the
conditional and the marginal densities for each employment transition, denoted by
g
t
(A
t+1
,w
t+1
|A
t
, w
t
). The subscript for the individual i, the parameter vector Θ,
employment status (expressed by a wage equal to zero), and layoffs are dropped from
the notation. There are five possible employment transitions:
1. Unemployment to unemployment:
g
t
(A
t+1
, 0|A
t
, 0) = λ
u
F [w
∗
t
(A
t+1
)] + (1− λ
u
), if A
t+1
= A
u
t+1
(A
t
).
2.Unemployment to employment:
g
t
(A
t+1
, w
t+1
|A
t
, 0) = λ
u
f(w
t+1
),if w
t+1
≥ w
∗
t+1
(A
t+1
) and A
t+1
= A
u
t+1
(A
t
).
3. Employment to unemployment:
Layoffs, l = 1: g
t
(A
t+1
, 0|A
t
, w
t
) = θ[λ
e
F (w
∗
[A
t+1
]) + (1− λ
e
)],
if A
t+1
= A
e
t+1
(A
t
, w
t
);
Quits, l = 0: g
t
(A
t+1
, 0|A
t
, w
t
) = (1 − θ) [λ
e
F (w
∗
[A
t+1
]) + (1− λ
e
)],
if w
∗
t+1
[A
t+1
] > w
t
and A
t+1
= A
e
t+1
(A
t
, w
t
);
4. Keep employer:
g
t
(A
t+1
, w
t
|A
t
, w
t
) = (1 − θ)[λ
e
F (w
t
) + (1− λ
e
)]
if w
t
≥ w
∗
t
[A
t+1
] and A
t+1
= A
e
t+1
(A
t
, w
t
);
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5. Change employer:
Layoffs, l = 1: g
t
(A
t+1
, w
t+1
|A
t
, w
t
) = θλ
e
f(w
t+1
), if w
t+1
≥ w
∗
t+1
[A
t+1
]
and A
t+1
= A
e
t+1
(A
t
, w
t
);
Quits, l = 0: g
t
(A
t+1
, w
t+1
|A
t
, w
t
) = (1− θ)λ
e
f (w
t+1
), if w
t+1
≥ max(w
t
, w
∗
t
[A
t+1
])
and A
t+1
= A
e
t+1
(A
t
, w
t
);
where g
t
(A
t+1
, w
t+1
|A
t
, w
t
) = 0, if the corresponding condition is not satisfied. I
introduce a measurement error in wealth and in wages to make the estimation feasible.
Observed wealth and observed wages are defined as the model’s predicted level plus a
measurement error: A
obs
t
= A
t
+ε
A
, lnw
obs
t
= lnw
t
+ε
w
, where ε
A
and ε
w
are normally
distributed, with zero mean and standard deviation σ
A
and σ
w
, respectively. It is
convenient to define the following densities:
h
A
(
A
obs
t
, A
t
)
=
1
σ
A
φ
(
A
obs
t
−A
t
σ
A
)
;
h
w
(
w
obs
t
, w
t
)
=
1
σ
w
φ
(
lnw
obs
t
− lnw
t
σ
w
)
.
where h
A
(
A
obs
t
, A
t
)
= 1, if wealth is not observed in the corresponding quarter. In the
theoretical model wealth and wages depend on past wealth and wages, implying that
there are several sequences of true wealth and wages that can produce the observed
sequence. The density for the whole observable sequence is then the integral of
the product of the conditional densities over all transitions, conditional on the first
observation at period t
0
:
L({Z
t
}
T
t=t
0+1
| Z
t
0
Θ) =
∫
· ·
∫
T
∏
t=t
0
h
A
(A
obs
t
,A
t
)h
w
(w
obs
t
, w
t
)g
t
(A
t
, w
t
|A
t−1
, w
t−1
) dA
t
dw
t
.
where g
0
(A
t
0
,w
t
0
|A
t
0−1
, w
t
0−1
) = 1. This likelihood function is computed exploiting
the discretization of the continuous variables performed to solve the DP problem;
therefore, the multiple integrations become summations, whose computation is sim-
plified by an iterative procedure. The parameters to estimate are Θ = {b, λ
u
, λ
e
, θ,
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µ, σ, γ, s, σ
A
, σ
w
}. The interest rate r and the discount factor β are fixed at 0.015
and at 0.98, respectively. The algorithm used to maximize this likelihood function
does not require derivatives.
4 Estimation Results
In this section I discuss the parameter estimates for the two race groups, explain the
computation of their initial wealth distribution, and compare actual and fitted vari-
ables: hazard rates at the first unemployment spell and trajectories for all observed
variables, both graphically and numerically.
4.1 Behavioral Parameters
The two sets of maximum likelihood estimates and the corresponding asymptotic
standard errors are reported in Table 4. Transfers while unemployed are $400 for
whites and $490 for blacks.
[Table 4 here]
Whites have a higher probability of getting a wage offer when unemployed than
blacks, but a lower probability of getting a wage offer when employed. The layoff
rate is 4.42% for whites and 5.39% for blacks. The mean and the standard deviation
of the log-wage offer distribution are 7.17 and 0.98 for whites and 7.09 and 0.78 for
blacks, respectively. As shown in Figure 3, these estimates show that the wage offer
distribution of whites stochastically dominates that of blacks.
[Figure 3 here]
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These estimates imply a more favorable labor market environment for whites than
for blacks. The estimated coefficient of risk-aversion γ is 1.3 for whites and 1.1 for
blacks. The parameter s capturing the tightness of the borrowing constraints is 0.11
for whites and 0.19 for blacks. A looser borrowing constraint for blacks than for
whites can be caused by the fact that, in general, blacks have less wealth than whites
at all times. To mimic this observed feature of the data, the model is forced to admit
a lower level of wealth for blacks.
These parameters produce reservation wages that are increasing in wealth, as
shown in Figure 4. Except for low levels of wealth, whites have higher reservation
wages than blacks.
[Figure 4 here]
These data, especially wealth data, are very noisy; accordingly, measurement er-
rors in both wages and wealth are high. For wealth the standard deviation of the
measurement error is 16,180 for whites and 10,245 for blacks; for log-wages it is 0.58
for whites and 0.58 for blacks. Asymptotic standard errors are calculated using the
OPG estimator and provided in parentheses; they are in general small.
4.2 Initial wealth distribution
The estimation was conditioned on the individuals’ first wealth observation, meaning
that data on employment status and wages from 1978 to 1985 have not been used
in the likelihood function. These data can be used to estimate the initial wealth
distribution. Let Z
0
= {A
0
, 0, 0, 0}, that is, agents are unemployed with wealth level
A
0
when they graduate from High School. Thus, the likelihood of observing the data
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for one individual from period 1 until period t
0
, conditional on wealth level A
0
is
L({Z
t
}
t
0
t=1
| A
0
,Θ) =
∫
· ·
∫
t
0
∏
t=1
h
A
(A
obs
t
, A
t
)h
w
(w
obs
t
, w
t
)g
t
(A
t
, w
t
|A
t−1
,w
t−1
) dA
t
dw
t
.
This function is computed in a similar way to the likelihood function described in
Section 4. Hence, the density function of initial wealth for each individual is
p (A
0
|Θ) =
L({Z
t
}
t
0
t=1
| A
0
,Θ)
∫
L({Z
t
}
t
0
t=1
| A,Θ)dA
.
[Figure 5 here]
Figure 5 illustrates the resulting cumulative distribution for white and black in-
dividuals. It is clear that the whites’ distribution dominates the blacks’ distribution,
except for one segment. With the recovered initial wealth distributions and the policy
rules computed at the parameter estimates, assuming that individuals are unemployed
when they graduate from High School, I generate simulated career paths for 10 draws
for each individual in each race subsample. From these simulated data, I compute
the hazard rate at the first unemployment spell and build a period-specific predicted
choice distribution.
4.3 Hazard Rate at the First Unemployment Spell
Figure 6 and Figure 7 show the actual and the predicted hazard rates for the first
unemployment spell. For both groups, the actual hazard rate presents negative dura-
tion dependence at the beginning of the spell and positive duration dependence at the
end of the spell, that is, the hazard rate is U-shaped. However, whites have a higher
hazard rate with steeper negative duration dependence than blacks. These patterns
are reproduced by the predicted hazard rates, but with some overprediction in levels.
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For whites the predicted hazard rate follows closely the actual hazard rate at the
beginning of the spell, but overpredicts it from the fifth quarter after graduation
on. For blacks, the predicted hazard is relatively constant at 0.3. In this model
the initial wealth distribution plays a crucial role for reproducing negative duration
dependence. In the model, conditional on one initial wealth level, hazard rates are
increasing over time: people reduce their wealth position while unemployed, so that
reservation wages decline and hazard rates increase. Initially, as poor individuals,
who exhibit high hazard rates, are first to exit unemployment, the average hazard
rate goes down, that is, the selection effect dominates over the increasing hazard rate
at each wealth level. Once poor agents have exited and unemployment and wealthy
agents remain unemployed, average hazard rates become increasing. Because blacks
have a lower and more concentrated wealth distribution, the selection effect is not
strong enough to fully capture the observed negative duration dependence in hazard
rates.
[Figure 6 and Figure 7 here]
4.4 Graphical Comparison
Figure 8 reports the paths for actual and predicted employment states, employment
transitions, average wealth and average wages by quarters after graduation. The
model replicates relatively well the unemployment rate (Figures 8a and 8b), the tran-
sition from unemployment to employment (Figures 8c and 8d), the transition from
employment to unemployment (Figures 8e and 8f) and the percentage of layoffs in
the transitions from employment to unemployment (Figures 8i and 8j). However, it
clearly underpredicts the percentage of people that change employers (Figures 8g and
8h) and the percentage of layoffs in the transitions from one employment to another
(Figures 8k and 8l).
[Figure 8 here]
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Figures 8m and 8n show that the model is able to mimic well the basic trend
in wealth accumulation; however, as shown in Figures 5o and 8p, it overpredicts
wages. Predicted average wages start higher than actual ones and grow slower than
their actual counterpart. This discrepancy may occur because, in the theoretical
model, wage growth is achieved only by switching to better paid jobs, whereas in the
data wages can increase while on the job. Measurement errors in wages and not the
theoretical model account for wage increases while working for the same employer.
In spite of this simplification, which seems to produce the overprediction in wages,
the model is able to replicate the tendency of wages to increase, so that the distance
between predicted and actual average wages goes down over time. These graphs
are illustrative of the success of the model in replicating the data; a more accurate
assessment needs goodness of fit tests.
4.5 Goodness of Fit Tests
To assess whether the parameter estimates capture the essential features of the data,
I compare the observed and the predicted choice distributions of employment, wealth,
and wages. Goodness of fit tests evaluate whether the cell-by-cell distribution of the
data can be produced by the theoretical model at the estimated parameters. Let
χ
2
= Σ
J
j=1
(n
jt
−nˆ
jt
)
2
nˆ
jt
, where n
jt
is the actual number of observations of choice j at time
t, and nˆ
jt
the model predicted counterpart. J is the total number of possible choices.
This statistic has an asymptotic χ
2
distribution with J − 1 degrees of freedom .
[Table 5 and Table 6 here]
Table 5 and Table 6 are a summary of the actual and predicted distributions of
all variables for years 3, 6, and 9 after graduation and for both race groups. As in the
graphical comparisons, lower distances between the model and the data are attained
for employment status, transitions from unemployment, and layoffs in the transitions
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from employment to unemployment. In these three distributions, and especially in
year 6, the χ
2
statistic falls below the critical value at a 5% of significance. However,
the choice distributions of the transitions from employment and of the transitions of
layoffs while changing employer do not pass the χ
2
test. The model does a better job
in approximating the actual distribution of wealth, but not of wages, as already seen
in the graphical comparisons. Notice, however, that the model’s fit for the black-white
wage ratio of wages is better than the one in levels. For wealth the χ
2
statistic tends
to fall below the critical value at a 5% of significance. For wages the null hypotheses,
i.e. that the data and the simulations come from the same distribution, is rejected,
although the χ
2
statistic goes down over time, reflecting the convergence of actual
and predicted wages discussed in the previous subsection.
5 Policy Experiments
In this section I perform some regime changes and report them in Table 7. The first
column shows selected predicted variables for the subsample of blacks, the second
column reports those same variables when blacks start off their careers with the
initial wealth distribution of whites, the third column shows the effects of blacks’
outcomes if they had whites’ arrival rates and the whites’ wage offer distribution, and
the fourth column shows the prediction for the whites’ subsample.
[Table 7 here]
The first experiment is a simulation of blacks variables if they had the initial
wealth distribution of whites and it is reported in Table 7, column 2. Given that the
initial wealth distribution of whites dominates that of blacks, both the duration of
the first unemployment spell and the first accepted wage of blacks increase slightly.
Later, the original and the counterfactual amounts tend to converge; forty quarters
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after graduation the increase in wages practically disappears, although wealth is still
substantially higher: the black-white wage ratio stays unaffected at 75% whereas the
black-white wealth ratio increases from 40% to 52%. This result is in line with pre-
vious research (Menchik & Jianakoplos 1997), which shows that inheritances account
for a range of between 10% and 20% in differences in household wealth.
The second experiment simulates blacks outcomes if they had the labor market
parameters of whites and is reported in Table 7, column 3. For blacks the unem-
ployment rate decreases and the average wage increases. The first accepted wage of
blacks increases from $3,324 to $4,322, which is higher than that of whites, $3,843;
forty quarters after graduation average wages increase from $4,176 to $5,633, slightly
higher than those of whites, $5,544. This experiment implies a rise in the black-white
wage ratio from 75% to 102% and and a rise in the black-white wealth ratio from
40% to 69%. These results suggest that labor market conditions rather than ini-
tial wealth are responsible for the observed differences in labor market performance
between blacks and whites, but not fully for the observed racial wealth gap.
6 Conclusions
The main purpose of this paper has been to determine the extent to which wealth
disparity is responsible for the observed differences in early employment careers of
black and white individuals. A utility-maximizing search model is shown to capture
the main quantitative features of the data. Through comparative statics experiments,
I show that most of the differences in labor market performance between blacks and
whites are accounted for by differences in their wage offer distributions and arrival
rates. If blacks had the initial wealth distribution of whites, they would experience a
modest increase in wages and only at the beginning of their employment careers.
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Table 1: Unemployment, Wealth and Wages by Years after Graduation.
White and Black Male High School Graduates (amounts in 1985 dollars)
Whites Blacks
Variable Year 3 Year 6 Year 9 Year 3 Year 6 Year 9
% Unemployed 18.34 10.94 8.83 34.24 19.26 19.68
% Unemployed
becoming Employed 37.42 45.05 47.89 24.88 22.81 33.04
% Employed:
becoming Unemployed 8.41 6.48 5.59 12.22 5.86 8.32
% Employed Quitting 11.39 8.50 5.18 9.54 8.16 7.44
to Unemployment 30.61 43.24 37.93 31.11 53.85 47.22
to Employment 65.67 80.00 66.67 47.22 72.22 58.62
Average Wealth 6023 9278 13329 1226 4146 5223
Black-White ratio (%) 20.36 44.69 39.19
% with
A ≤ 0 6.25 12.32 10.00 4.23 5.66 5.31
0 < A ≤ 10, 000 75.00 57.25 47.14 94.37 82.08 80.53
10, 000 < A ≤ 20, 000 9.38 18.12 17.14 0.00 7.55 6.19
20, 000 < A ≤ 30, 000 6.25 3.62 10.71 1.41 1.89 3.54
A > 30, 000 3.13 8.70 15.00 0.00 2.83 4.42
Average Quarterly Wage 3363 4114 4552 3104 3473 3739
Black-White ratio (%) 92.30 84.41 82.14
% with
w ≤ 2, 000 16.72 8.45 4.64 20.23 12.73 10.92
2, 000 < w ≤ 4, 000 58.19 50.69 38.17 61.27 60.68 56.07
4, 000 < w ≤ 6, 000 18.56 27.65 40.72 16.18 19.09 21.60
w > 6, 000 6.52 13.21 16.47 2.31 7.50 11.41
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Table 2: Composition of Net Wealth by Wealth level and Years after Graduation
Whites Blacks
Wealth in Thousands Wealth in Thousands
0-10 10-20 20-30 +30 0-10 10-20 20-30 +30
Years ≤ 6
Residential 7 17 24 23 2 22 39 15
Financial 24 19 15 19 25 13 30 49
Business 5 5 14 42 1 5 8 0
Vehicles 50 33 33 6 51 42 10 14
Other 14 25 15 10 18 28 12 23
Years > 6
Residential 16 31 32 26 8 29 30 39
Financial 22 19 21 39 19 18 20 37
Business 5 3 4 22 1 2 4 23
Vehicles 53 29 26 7 49 28 24 6
Other 4 18 17 6 24 23 22 6
Table 3: Average Wealth by Wages and Years after Graduation in 1985 dollars
Whites Blacks
Wages Years ≤ 6 Years > 6 Years ≤ 6 Years > 6
w ≤ 2, 000 1368 2940 730 1933
2,000 < w ≤ 4, 000 5453 9178 2273 3188
4,000 < w ≤ 6, 000 8508 13766 4699 8592
w > 6, 000 8744 15178 6115 10335
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Table 4: Parameter Estimates and Asymptotic Standard Errors
Whites Blacks
Θ Estimates (ASE) Estimates (ASE)
b 398.31 (50.03) 494.14 (77.49)
λ
u
0.932635 (0.078587) 0.838318 (0.016471)
λ
e
0.132450 (0.026429) 0.161893 (0.069360)
θ 0.044196 (0.010314) 0.053863 (0.022409)
µ 7.171731 (0.051495) 7.093364 (0.029809)
σ 0.978521 (0.078744) 0.775161 (0.010701)
γ 1.309576 (0.142095) 1.099607 (0.349032)
s 0.107575 (0.014880) 0.191506 (0.030502)
σ
A
16179.24 (584.88) 10245.36 (255.71)
σ
w
0.578676 (0.015361) 0.581876 (0.016204)
−lnL 5750.58 4664.58
Nobs 212 158
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Table 5: Summary. Whites: Actual and Predicted Choice Distribution (%):
All Variables for three selected Years after Graduation
Years after Graduation
Year 3 Year 6 Year 9 Total
Act. Pred. Act. Pred. Act. Pred. Act. Pred.
Employment Status
Unemployment 18.34 14.35 10.94 13.27 8.83 14.09 14.83 16.68
Employment 81.66 85.65 89.06 86.73 91.17 85.91 85.17 83.32
χ
2
10.95 3.92 18.38 20.50
Transitions from Unemployment
to Unemployment 62.58 56.61 54.95 63.38 52.11 69.21 58.08 60.65
to Employment 37.42 43.39 45.05 36.62 47.89 30.79 41.92 39.35
χ
2
1.76 3.38 15.53 3.84
Transitions from Employment
to Unemployment 8.41 6.72 6.48 5.33 5.59 5.09 6.31 6.65
to same Employment 80.29 91.09 85.02 92.97 89.22 93.05 85.16 91.45
to a new Employment 11.30 2.19 8.50 1.70 5.18 1.85 8.53 1.90
χ
2
333.04 233.22 49.57 1952.98
Transitions from Employment
to Unenployment
Layoffs 69.39 55.94 56.76 72.19 62.07 81.67 58.96 61.77
Quits 30.61 44.06 43.24 27.81 37.93 18.33 41.04 38.23
χ
2
3.59 4.39 7.44 1.16
to a new Employment
Layoffs 34.33 6.92 20.00 5.60 33.33 12.59 30.38 6.74
Quits 65.67 93.08 80.00 94.40 66.67 87.41 69.62 93.26
χ
2
78.17 21.57 12.90 471.30
Wealth
Average 6023 6461 9278 10741 13329 14425 10606 9831
Distribution:
A ≤ 0 6.25 17.62 12.32 8.76 10.00 5.51 9.83 16.08
0 < A ≤ 10, 000 75.00 58.75 57.25 50.28 47.14 41.90 57.45 47.31
10, 000 < A ≤ 20, 000 9.38 14.62 18.12 23.93 17.14 26.14 15.68 19.89
20, 000 < A ≤ 30, 000 6.25 6.75 3.62 10.31 10.71 12.74 6.33 9.22
A > 30, 000 3.13 2.26 8.70 6.72 15.00 13.71 10.71 7.49
χ
2
9.01 12.05 11.01 79.92
Wages
Average 3363 4653 4114 4890 4552 4970 3923 4780
Distribution:
w ≤ 2, 000 16.72 10.29 8.45 7.91 4.64 6.60 10.66 9.09
2, 000 < w ≤ 4, 000 58.19 35.98 50.69 34.19 38.17 33.45 49.74 34.73
4, 000 < w ≤ 6, 000 18.56 27.28 27.65 27.95 40.72 29.25 28.07 27.88
w > 6, 000 6.52 26.46 13.21 29.94 16.47 30.69 11.53 28.29
χ
2
212.65 112.92 82.42 1043.99
Crit. values at 5% signif.: χ
2
(1)
= 3.84, χ
2
(2)
= 5.99, χ
2
(3)
= 7.81, χ
2
(4)
= 9.49, χ
2
(9)
= 16.92;
Crit. values at .5% signif.: χ
2
(1)
= 7.88, χ
2
(2)
= 10.60, χ
2
(3)
= 12.84, χ
2
(4)
= 14.86, χ
2
(9)
= 23.59.
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Table 6: Summary. Blacks: Actual and Predicted Choice Distribution (%):
All Variables for three selected Years after Graduation
Years after Graduation
Year 3 Year 6 Year 9 Total
Act. Pred. Act. Pred. Act. Pred. Act. Pred.
Employment Status
Unemployment 34.24 17.20 19.26 16.95 19.68 14.45 28.19 19.74
Employment 65.76 82.80 80.74 83.05 80.32 85.55 71.81 80.26
χ
2
126.89 2.25 12.63 268.37
Transitions from Unemployment
to Unemployment 75.12 63.48 77.19 66.48 66.96 66.70 73.05 65.70
to Employment 24.88 36.52 22.81 33.52 33.04 33.30 26.95 34.30
χ
2
6.25 5.17 0.00 28.20
Transitions from Employment
to Unemployment 12.22 6.69 5.86 6.53 8.32 5.88 9.43 6.79
to same Employment 78.24 90.64 85.98 91.27 84.25 91.90 81.74 90.72
to a new Employment 9.54 2.68 8.16 2.19 7.44 2.22 8.83 2.49
χ
2
141.75 98.10 77.88 1056.40
Transitions from Employment
to Unemployment
Layoffs 68.89 80.00 46.15 82.51 52.78 86.79 57.53 78.04
Quits 31.11 20.00 53.85 17.49 47.22 13.21 42.47 21.96
χ
2
3.47 23.81 36.34 91.29
to a new Employment
Layoffs 52.78 10.00 27.78 13.91 41.38 7.50 38.74 10.41
Quits 47.22 90.00 72.22 86.09 58.62 92.50 61.26 89.59
χ
2
73.20 5.78 47.98 286.32
Wealth
Average 1226 1763 4146 3522 5223 5271 4000 3350
Black-White ratio (%) 20.36 27.29 44.69 32.79 39.19 36.54 37.71 34.08
Distribution:
A ≤ 0 4.23 58.02 5.66 44.26 5.31 38.35 5.69 49.04
0 < A ≤ 10, 000 94.37 28.91 82.08 38.77 80.53 39.45 83.39 33.77
10, 000 < A ≤ 20, 000 0.00 7.90 7.55 11.55 6.19 12.47 5.69 10.01
20, 000 < A ≤ 30, 000 1.41 3.86 1.89 3.50 3.54 5.35 1.93 4.16
A > 30, 000 0.00 1.31 2.83 1.93 4.42 4.38 3.30 3.02
χ
2
148.29 89.67 84.78 1004.63
Wages
Average 3104 4064 3473 4164 3739 4170 3384 4084
Black-White ratio (%) 92.30 87.34 84.41 85.15 82.14 83.90 86.26 85.44
Distribution
w ≤ 2, 000 20.23 17.06 12.73 14.78 10.92 14.87 14.57 16.19
2, 000 < w ≤ 4, 000 61.27 40.84 60.68 40.96 56.07 41.06 60.27 41.22
4, 000 < w ≤ 6, 000 16.18 23.66 19.09 24.23 21.60 24.49 18.58 23.89
w > 6, 000 2.31 18.44 7.50 20.02 11.41 19.59 6.58 18.70
χ
2
94.39 82.30 42.39 680.94
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Table 7: Policy Experiments
Prediction Counterfactuals Prediction
Blacks Blacks’s with whites’ Whites
p(A
0
), λ
u
, λ
e
, θ,
s µ, σ
First unemployment spell
Duration of unemployment 2.98 2.91 2.88 2.40
First accepted wage 3324 3300 4340 3925
Black-White ratio % 84.69 84.07 110.57 100.00
1st Quarter after Graduation
Unemployment rate (%) 68.67 69.62 67.78 54.48
Wealth 3311 4734 3311 5325
Black-White ratio % 62.18 88.90 62.18 100.00
Wages 3286 3354 4322 3843
Black-White ratio % 85.51 87.28 112.46 100.00
Consumption 2410 2356 2852 2682
Black-White ratio % 90.23 87.84 106.34 100.00
10th Quarter after Graduation
Unemployment rate (%) 17.41 17.53 16.01 14.39
Wealth 1679 3666 2758 6247
Black-White ratio % 26.88 58.68 44.15 100.00
Wages 3880 3838 5172 4839
Black-White ratio % 80.18 79.31 106.88 100.00
Consumption 3165 3148 4126 3907
Black-White ratio % 81.01 80.57 105.60 100.00
20th Quarter after Graduation
Unemployment rate (%) 16.01 16.27 14.75 14.48
Wealth 3210 5249 5787 9991
Black-White ratio % 32.13 52.54 57.92 100.00
Wages 4056 4047 5435 5206
Black-White ratio % 77.91 77.73 104.40 100.00
Consumption 3401 3404 4541 4381
Black-White ratio % 77.63 77.70 103.65 100.00
40th Quarter after Graduation
Unemployment rate (%) 17.28 17.28 15.25 14.58
Wealth 6415 8435 11189 16131
Black-White ratio % 39.77 52.29 69.36 100.00
Wages 4176 4165 5633 5544
Black-White ratio % 75.33 75.13 101.61 100.00
Consumption 3453 3497 4699 4688
Black-White ratio % 73.66 74.60 100.24 100.00
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Figure 2: Transitions from Employment
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Figure 6: Whites’ Hazard Rates: First Unemployment Spell
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Figure 7: Blacks’ Hazard Rates: First Unemployment Spell
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Figure 8 (cont): Actual and Predicted Paths by Race Group:
Layoffs, Wealth, and Wages
